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Abstract 
The ability to acquire language is a critical part of human development. Yet there 
is no consensus on how the skill emerges in early development. Does it constitute 
an innately-specified, language-processing module or is it acquired progressively? 
One of Karmiloff-Smith’s (1938-2016) key contributions to developmental 
science addresses this very question. Karmiloff-Smith persistently maintained that 
the process of development itself constitutes a crucial factor in phenotypic 
outcomes. She proposed that cognitive modules gradually emerge through a 
developmental process – ‘progressive modularization’. This concept helped to 
advance the field beyond the stale nature-nurture controversy. It enabled language 
researchers to develop more nuanced transactional frameworks that take seriously 
the integration of genes and environment. In homage to Karmiloff-Smith, the 
current paper describes the importance of her work to the field of developmental 
psychology and language research. It examines how the concept of progressive 
modularization could be applied to language development as well as how it has 
greatly advanced our understanding of language difficulties in children with 
neurodevelopmental disorders. Finally, it discusses how Karmiloff-Smith’s 
approach is inspiring current and future research. 
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Introduction 
Language is a highly complex system. Yet infants acquire it rapidly and with 
relative ease. The speed and ease with which infants acquire their first language is 
so great that some theorists, nativists, take it as evidence that evolution endowed 
the human neonate with a built-in, genetically-specified language module 
(Chomsky, 1959, 1975, 1991). How else can a child learn something as complex 
as language so fast? Karmiloff-Smith’s mentor, the great developmental 
psychologist Jean Piaget, rejected the nativist approach because, in his view, 
cognitive abilities (including those that subserve language) are too complex to be 
genetically specified; they must be constructed over developmental time through 
child-environment interactions (Piaget, 1970; see also Gottlieb, 1991; Oyama, 
1985). Specifically, Piaget claimed that new developmental structures in childhood 
emerge through widespread cognitive reorganization as a result of interactions 
between cognitive processes (and/or sensory reflexes), the child’s active 
exploration of the external world, and domain-general learning mechanisms 
(Piaget, 1970). But Piaget failed to explain how the child knows what must be 
learned and when (Fodor, 1980). For example, what aspects of the environment 
should the child pay attention to and when? What aspects of the speech stream 
should the child pay attention to and when? Are there any aspects of the speech 
stream that can be ignored? 
One of Karmiloff-Smith’s key contributions to developmental science was 
her advocacy for a ‘middle ground’ between nativism and Piagetian 
constructivism (Karmiloff-Smith, 1990). The middle ground was the theory that, 
over developmental time, neural circuits are progressively selected for different 
domain-specific computations. Some of these neural circuits gradually acquire the 
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properties (e.g., encapsulated information) of a module (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). 
In other words, whereas nativists claim that genes orchestrate the development of 
sophisticated cognitive modules (including language modules), Karmiloff-Smith 
(1992) argued that the modules are experience-dependent products of 
development.1 Whereas Piaget (1970) advocated for general learning mechanisms 
that operate across cognitive/motor domains and modalities (e.g., the assimilation 
vs. accommodation of new information), Karmiloff-Smith (1992) proposed that 
innate domain-relevant mechanisms initially bias the infant’s attention to 
important sources of information and constrain how the infant acts and processes 
information; these dynamic child-environment interactions help shape neural 
connectivity and the gradual emergence of domain-specific modules. 
Karmiloff-Smith’s ‘middle ground’ is one that, arguably, most 
developmental scientists now broadly adopt (e.g., Mareschal et al., 2007).2 
Although, like Piagetian constructivism, the general concept of progressive 
modularization (the middle ground) will not be completely mapped out until 
specific neurocognitive mechanisms of change have been identified and 
elucidated, Karmiloff-Smith’s (1992) theory is consistent with developmental 																																																								1	Neurobiological	evidence	supports	this	view.	For	example,	when	small	portions	of	cortex	are	transplanted	into	different	regions,	they	develop	features	specific	to	the	new	region	(e.g.,	Schlaggar	&	O’Leary,	1991).	Also,	when	projections	from	one	sensory	modality	are	rerouted	to	cortices	that	typically	receive	projections	from	a	different	modality,	then	the	recipient	cortex	develops	functional	properties	appropriate	for	information	from	the	rerouted	projections	(e.g.,	Frost	&	Metin,	1985;	Sur	et	al.,	1988,	1990).	In	other	words,	the	brain	is	not	initially	modular	and	representational	information	is	not	embedded	in	cortical	structure;	the	identity	and	functions	of	a	brain	region	are	experience-dependent.	2Although	Karmiloff-Smith’s	approach	occupies	ground	between	nativism	and	Piagetian	constructivism,	it	is	important	to	also	note	that	both	Karmiloff-Smith’s	neuroconstructivism	and	Piaget’s	constructivism	occupy	ground	between	nativism	and	empiricism.	For	the	nativist,	genes	orchestrate	the	construction	of	domain-specific	cognitive	modules	–	the	child	is	born	innately	expecting	nouns,	verbs,	and	grammatical	rules.	For	the	empiricist,	nouns,	verbs,	and	grammatical	rules	are	extracted	from	the	social	and	physical	environment	–	the	child	discovers	language.	Although	domain-general	mechanisms	such	as	‘statistical	learning’	undoubtedly	help	the	child	to	acquire	language	by	extracting	important	information	from	the	environment	(see	D’Souza,	D’Souza,	&	Karmiloff-Smith,	2017,	for	discussion),	Karmiloff-Smith	(1998)	and	Piaget	(1970)	rejected	both	nativism	and	empiricism;	development	involves	deep	interactions	between	genes	and	environment.	
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systems theory which states that the structure of the adult brain is not 
predetermined but is gradually constructed from complex cascades of gene-
environment interactions (‘probabilistic epigenesis’; Gottleib, 1991). It is also 
consistent with evidence in the developmental cognitive neuroscience literature, 
which suggests that the infant brain is characterized by diffuse, barely-discriminate 
functional brain activity that only gradually becomes more focal and selective over 
developmental time (Johnson, 2001, 2011; Karmiloff-Smith, 2009). 
 
The importance of progressive modularization 
By applying a developmental perspective to a major debate in cognitive 
science (nativism vs. empiricism, domain-specific vs. domain-general 
mechanisms), not only did Karmiloff-Smith help progress the field beyond the 
nature-nurture controversy, but she also demonstrated the importance of taking 
development seriously. The child development literature often focuses on what 
cognitive science can offer developmental science. But Karmiloff-Smith (1992) 
demonstrated that developmental science has a lot to offer cognitive science. To 
gain a more nuanced understanding of the internal structure of the adult brain, 
cognitive scientists must elucidate: (1) early neurocognitive biases, (2) 
developmental processes such as progressive modularization, functional 
specialization, and ‘restriction of fate’, and (3) how internal representations 
change over developmental time (Karmiloff-Smith, 1986, 1992).  
Take, for example, language learning. Adult Japanese speakers who are 
learning English have difficulty in accurately discriminating /r/ from /l/ 
(Hernandez & Li, 2007). Studying the adult brain (the “end-state”) is unlikely to 
reveal why the adult Japanese brain struggles to discriminate /r/ from /l/. But 
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developmental studies reveal how infants’ perceptual abilities start out broadly 
tuned to the environment and gradually narrow as they adapt to their specific 
environments. This developmental process of perceptual narrowing is a case of 
functional specialization (see Johnson, 2011), which has been identified in several 
domains, including face perception (Pascalis et al., 2005), motor ability (D’Souza, 
Cowie, Karmiloff-Smith, & Bremner, 2017), and language. In the language 
domain, it is manifested in an increase in the infant’s ability to discriminate 
familiar (native) speech sounds, coupled with a decrease in the ability to 
discriminate unfamiliar (non-native) speech sounds during the first year of life 
(Kuhl, 2006; Werker & Tees, 1984). In other words, the adult brain—and its 
ability to discriminate /r/ from /l/—is emergent from developmental processes, 
which reflect complex interactions between various internal (e.g., attention) and 
external (e.g., social) factors over developmental time (see D’Souza, D’Souza, & 
Karmiloff-Smith, 2017, for details). Even an ostensibly small variation in early 
development may change the infant’s long-term developmental trajectory. For 
example, the condition of preterm birth may constrain language development at 
preschool and school age. Six- and eight-year-old preterms performed worse on a 
battery of language tasks than age-matched fullterms, even with an absence of 
general cognitive delay and brain damage (Guarini et al., 2009, 2010). To 
understand the internal structure of the adult brain, it is therefore imperative that 
developmental processes are identified and investigated (D’Souza & Karmiloff-
Smith, 2011, 2016). 
The utility of Karmiloff-Smith’s (1992) theory of progressive 
modularization also extends to the field of individual differences. Most 
experimental tasks in psychology and cognitive neuroscience treat individual 
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differences as background noise, and experimenters focus on identifying the 
desired signal amidst the noise. For example, if a scientist hypothesizes that there 
is a direct causal relationship between brain size and vocabulary size, then he or 
she may test their hypothesis by ascertaining whether children with a larger brain 
have a larger lexicon than children with a smaller brain. If the result of their 
analysis is significant, then they may conclude that their data hint at a causal 
relationship and that any “noise” in their data is the result of measurement error. 
But if brain development involves progressive modularization—a probabilistic, 
rather than a predetermined, process—then the scientist ought to care about 
individual differences (“noise”) as well as any overall or group effect (the 
“signal”). This is because variation necessarily plays a role in shaping 
developmental processes (e.g., modularization) and outcomes (e.g., modules).  
In other words, if language development is innately predetermined, then 
researchers need to average out individual differences in task performance to 
unmask the genetically prespecified language module that evolution has 
purportedly endowed infants with. However, if language abilities are gradually 
constructed from complex interactions between multiple interdependent (internal 
and external) factors over developmental time, then researchers should investigate 
variations in these factors if they want to understand how language arises; they 
should not expect a direct causal relationship between any two factors. Take, for 
example, the role of attention. A nativist may want to average out individual 
differences in attention during a language task to unmask what he or she believes 
is an independent, minimally interactive language module. But a 
neuroconstructivist would argue that language abilities arise in part from how the 
infant focuses and shifts attention in naturalistic environments. Therefore, studying 
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variations in these attentional processes, and how they relate to infant-environment 
interactions, is critical to understanding language development (D’Souza, 
D’Souza, & Karmiloff-Smith, 2017). 
Karmiloff-Smith’s theory of progressive modularization therefore has far-
reaching implications for domains within developmental psychology (e.g., the 
field of individual differences) as well as for domains external to developmental 
psychology (e.g., cognitive science). But perhaps Karmiloff-Smith’s greatest 
contribution was to the field of atypical development. Why do some children 
struggle to develop language? Karmiloff-Smith’s theory sheds light on atypical 
language development. 
 
When progressive modularization goes awry 
According to nativists, at least some aspects of language (e.g., grammar) 
develop independently from other cognitive functions, and atypical language 
development results from genetic defects that impact the formation of the language 
module. Evidence that initially seemed to support this claim was brought to the 
attention of cognitive scientists in the late 1980s in the form of a rare “experiment 
of nature”: Williams syndrome (Bellugi et al., 1988, 1994). This rare genetic 
disorder is caused by microdeletion of about 26 genes from chromosome 7. 
Individuals with Williams syndrome present with an uneven cognitive profile 
including mild to moderate intellectual disability, severe cognitive impairments in 
the visuospatial domain, and relative strengths in language and face processing. 
The case of Williams syndrome had important implications for fundamental 
questions that were being debated in the cognitive sciences, such as the extent to 
which the mind is modular, the role of innate knowledge in language development, 
and the relationship between language and cognition. This was especially true 
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when some researchers contrasted Williams syndrome with a group of children 
diagnosed with ‘specific language impairment’ (SLI). Children with SLI appeared 
to have spared intellectual—but impaired language—ability. To quote Pinker 
(1999): “The genes of one group of children [with SLI] impair their grammar 
while sparing general intelligence; the genes of another group of children [with 
Williams syndrome] impair their intelligence while sparing their grammar” (p. 
262). From this nativist perspective, developmental processes play only a minor 
role and the job of the research scientist is to identify selective (domain-specific) 
neurocognitive impairments (e.g., language) and attribute them to missing or 
malfunctioning genes.  
According to Karmiloff-Smith (1998), however, a small genetic deficit is 
likely to have cascading effects on the developing brain, such as perturbing the 
process of gradual modularization. This would affect how the infant selects and 
processes environmental input, and impact child-parent interactions, both of which 
would further constrain brain and cognitive development (D’Souza, D’Souza, & 
Karmiloff-Smith, 2017; Karmiloff-Smith et al., 2012). Hence, impairments are 
likely to be widespread (though some might be subtle), and the research strategy 
of the neuroconstructivist is not to identify genetic defects and domain-specific 
impairments but rather to understand the complex interplay of internal and 
external constraining factors over developmental time, with a focus on studying 
the developmental effects that the lowest level of impairment has on later-
emerging higher-level cognitive processes (Karmiloff-Smith, 1998).  
Do empirical data lend support to Karmiloff-Smith’s probabilistic 
progressive modularization perspective or to Pinker’s predetermined genetic 
approach? Although adults with Williams syndrome are often described as having 
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‘perfect’ grammar (e.g., Piatelli-Palmarini, 2001), this is not surprising when one 
considers the fact that the typically developing child has mastered most syntactic 
structures by 3 to 4 years of age (Brock, 2007; Karmiloff-Smith, 1998). Yet 
contrary to claims of spared language abilities in the early literature (Bellugi et al., 
1988, 1994), there is no compelling evidence to suggest that individuals with 
Williams syndrome outperform typically developing (TD) controls of comparable 
mental age on tests of syntax or morphology (see Brock, 2007, for review). In 
other words, grammatical abilities are delayed, not ‘spared’, in Williams 
syndrome. For example, grammatical gender assignment is worse in French-
speaking individuals with Williams syndrome than in TD controls (Karmiloff-
Smith et al., 1997). Furthermore, some aspects of complex grammar—such as 
passives of psychological verbs and raising constructions—are possibly never 
acquired in Williams syndrome (Perovic & Wexler, 2007, 2010). Moreover, 
evidence that the visuospatial deficit in Williams syndrome is mirrored by specific 
difficulties with grammatical constructs involving spatial or relational terms 
suggest that language and cognition do not develop independently in these 
children (Landau & Zukowski, 2003; Lukacs et al., 2004; Phillips et al., 2004). 
What about the claim that language is a specific impairment in SLI? 
Fonteneau and van der Lely (2008) presented sentences containing syntactic or 
semantic violations to individuals with grammatical-SLI (G-SLI). Whereas the 
semantic violations elicited a normal N400 electrophysiological response, the 
syntactic violations failed to elicit an early left-anterior negative (ELAN) response 
and yet elicited a P600 (which indexes reanalysis). This led the authors to claim 
“that grammatical neural circuitry underlying language is a developmentally 
unique system in the functional architecture of the brain, and this complex higher 
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cognitive system can be selectively impaired” (p. 1). However, as D’Souza and 
Karmiloff-Smith (2011) pointed out, the participants were adolescents with a 
receptive vocabulary of children half their chronological age, so the deficit was not 
confined to grammar. Furthermore, the P600 was maximally distributed on 
anterior sites in the right hemisphere rather than being equally lateralized, 
suggesting that the P600 may not have been ‘typical’. Many researchers (e.g., 
Krishnan, Watkins, & Bishop, 2016) no longer consider language to be the only 
impairment in SLI. 
The debate between the two approaches is not over. Nativists such as 
Spelke (2000) and Carey (2009) still argue that core aspects of human knowledge, 
including language, originate from an architecture that is, itself, highly 
constrained. But if language development is controlled by a predetermined 
language module, then damage to it should result in irrevocable language 
impairment. Yet perinatal lesions to ‘language areas’ of the brain do not prevent a 
child from learning language. Most children with left hemispherectomy early in 
life subsequently fall within the normal range on language tests and attend age-
appropriate schools (Stiles, Bates, Thal, Trauner, & Reilly, 2002). This suggests 
that the developing brain is flexibly adapting to its environment. Adults with left 
hemispherectomy, however, often present with irrevocable language impairment. 
Furthermore, whereas left anterior damage particularly impairs grammatical 
abilities in adults, it causes only a temporary general language delay in children 
under 5 years of age (see Bates & Roe, 2001, for review). This suggests that the 
adult brain has specialized to such an extent that it has lost some of its early 
unconstrained plasticity. In other words, highly constrained, minimally-interactive 
modules are gradually constructed over developmental time, so an injury at an 
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early timepoint may have very different neurocognitive effects than an injury at a 
later timepoint. 
Developmental theories may also help to explain the mixed effects of 
aphasia (the impaired ability to comprehend and/or produce language as a result of 
brain damage) on children’s language processing abilities. Karmiloff-Smith (1986) 
proposed four different levels of linguistic representation in the human brain: (1) 
‘implicit’ representations, which are procedural and cannot be manipulated, (2) 
‘primary explication’ representations, which can be accessed tacitly (e.g., in real-
time lexical decision tasks), (3) ‘secondary explication’ representations, which can 
be accessed consciously (e.g., in word-picture matching), and (4) ‘tertiary 
explication’ where links across domains and subdomains can be drawn (e.g., 
semantic similarity judgements). Karmiloff-Smith (1986) argued that different 
aspects of language can be represented at different levels in different children at 
different timepoints in development. This would explain why the nature of aphasia 
varies more in children than in adults – i.e., because not all linguistic knowledge is 
represented at the highest level in young children, so similar injuries can have very 
different effects depending on when in development they occur. 
Taking development seriously is also critical because new structures in the 
brain emerge as adaptions to the infant’s environment, compensating for 
weaknesses. Indeed, Johnson (2017) argues that some phenotypic outcomes and 
conditions (e.g., autism) are not static genetic disorders but rather neurocognitive 
adaptations in response to genetic deficits and a complex environment. For 
example, he proposes that repetitive behaviours observed in children with autism 
are not the direct result of faulty genes but are adaptations in response to neural 
imbalance; the child cannot process normal environmental input and thus needs to 
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simplify it (Johnson, 2017). Thus, Karmiloff-Smith’s (1998) developmental 
approach is the foundation upon which we base our current theories; to understand 
how a disorder emerges, researchers must study how variation (genetic, 
environmental) in the initial start state constrains downstream gene-environment 
interactions, leading to an uneven cognitive profile where some domains develop 
relatively better than others. 
In sum, the debate between nativists and neuroconstructivists continues. 
Few (if any) scientists would now argue that the ability to learn language is 
directly controlled by genes or directly controlled by influences external to the 
child, but detailed transactional frameworks that take seriously the integration of 
genes and environment are still being hotly contested: How domain-specific or 
domain-general are language-learning processes? How much information about 
the external world is contained at the level of the gene? To what extent can gene 
expression be manipulated by environmental factors such as parenting? Karmiloff-
Smith’s key contribution to language research was to convince researchers that 
their fundamental questions can only be understood by adopting a developmental 
approach. 
 
Why only humans possess language  
Moreover, Karmiloff-Smith (1992) was convinced that understanding 
developmental processes informs science of what separates humans from other 
mammals. If the human brain does not start out with prespecified modules (e.g., 
for language), and yet we still cannot train chimpanzees, our closest relatives, to 
learn language, then developmental processes involving innate biases, as well as 
environmental input, may play an important role in differentiating the adult human 
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from the adult chimpanzee. What might that developmental process be? 
Karmiloff-Smith (1992) hypothesized that it was a process of progressive 
explication, whereby knowledge (representations) stored in the mind is 
progressively turned into explicit knowledge to the mind (‘representational 
redescription’). This developmental process would allow the human child to reuse 
information for other purposes. It would also allow the human child to integrate 
representational information across different domains and thus construct new 
knowledge from distinct parts.  
Take language, for example. Early in development, the human infant builds 
up a database of linguistic representations which help it to communicate with 
others. Karmiloff-Smith (1992) argued that these representations are initially 
stored and run as independent, sequentially-specified procedures. Many animals 
can respond appropriately to learned words – for example, dogs can be taught to 
obey verbal commands. However, Karmiloff-Smith speculated that only the 
human child has the potential to take its own representations as objects of 
cognitive attention. Her favourite example was a conversation she had with her 4-
year-old daughter, Yara. “What’s that?” inquired Yara. Karmiloff-Smith 
responded by saying that it was a typewriter. “No,” rebuffed Yara: “You’re the 
typewriter, that’s a typewrite”. Karmiloff-Smith (1992) argued that this was 
evidence of metalinguistic reflection. Not only could Yara use words, she had also 
worked out that the suffix “-er” is agentive and thus rejected the label provided by 
her mother. In other words, she exploited her knowledge in a way that prima facie 
non-human animals do not. Karmiloff-Smith (1992) argued that some of the 
knowledge embedded implicitly in linguistic procedures had been transformed 
(‘redescribed’) into a format that could be analysed and manipulated and, later in 
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development, serve other cognitive domains. While it is true that humans 
spontaneously play with and exploit knowledge, it is not clear whether other 
animals do. Non-human animals can learn and produce independent action 
patterns, such as making requests for food, but there are no examples in the 
literature of a non-human animal analysing its own linguistic knowledge and using 
the component parts as Yara did upon hearing the label typewriter. Irrespective of 
whether the theory of representational redescription will be borne out by the 
evidence, Karmiloff-Smith once again demonstrated the importance of thinking 
developmentally and applying a developmental perspective to understanding 
fundamental questions in language-related sciences. 
 
A developmental approach to research on multilanguage acquisition  
Annette Karmiloff-Smith was a proficient bilingual and had worked as a 
simultaneous interpreter for the United Nations. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
one of her interests was about the acquisition of multiple languages and, 
specifically, how this can affect cognitive development (and decline) throughout 
the lifespan.  
Research in the field of bilingualism/multilingualism has soared in the last 
two decades for three main reasons: (1) it is estimated that more than half of the 
world’s population regularly speaks more than one language (Grosjean, 2010); (2) 
there is growing evidence that the acquisition of multiple languages may enrich 
cognitive development, especially executive functions (e.g., Bialystok, 2009); and 
(3) there is some evidence that the use of multiple languages may serve as a 
neurological protector in later stages of life, and may also delay the onset of 
dementia (e.g., Bak, Nissan, Allerhand & Deary, 2014). 
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On this line, Karmiloff-Smith inspired and co-authored a seminal study of 
control of interference in language comprehension carried out in a primary school 
in the UK (Filippi, Karmiloff-Smith et al., 2015). English monolingual and 
bilingual children from different linguistic backgrounds aged 7-10 years were 
compared when performing a sentence comprehension task in the presence of 
verbal interference. Bilingual children outperformed monolingual peers; they were 
more accurate in comprehending speech (i.e., in identifying the subject of a 
sentence) than monolingual children. Remarkably, bilingual children had better 
responses than monolinguals when comprehending particularly difficult and more 
cognitively demanding sentences, such as passives. 
This study is the basis for two current larger scale projects that aim to build 
a developmental trajectory from infancy to older age, of the effects of multi-
language acquisition on cognitive abilities, including memory, visual and auditory 
attention, core and higher-level executive functions, and metacognitive processing. 
These projects are heavily characterized by Karmiloff-Smith’s theoretical and 
experimental approach. For example, the prevailing theory for the bilingual 
advantage suggests that bilinguals have to draw upon a domain-general resource—
inhibitory control—to inhibit the automatic activation of non-target languages in 
order to produce only the target language (Green, 1998). However, neither this 
theory nor others explain why a bilingual advantage has been found in preverbal 
infants exposed to bilingual environments. Taking inspiration from Annette 
Karmiloff-Smith, we strongly advocate that a developmental perspective is needed 
to generate new hypotheses and advance the research in this area (Filippi, D’Souza 
& Bright, in preparation).        
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In addition, the main challenge for research of multi-language acquisition 
is to pinpoint the exact mechanisms that determine differences between 
monolinguals and bilinguals using a convergence of methods, including 
neuroimaging, genetic and qualitative techniques. The current literature provides 
evidence from individual studies involving infants, children, young adults, adults 
and the elderly in a non-developmental way, focusing on a single age group, in a 
single domain, and with different tasks. The current theoretical frameworks do not 
fully provide an account of all the subtle differences that occur between the 
monolingual and the multilingual brain through development. Karmiloff-Smith 
stressed the need to approach this line of investigation with the aim to explore 
change over developmental time and to focus on the interaction of different 
domains across the lifespan (Filippi & Karmiloff-Smith, 2013).  	
 
Karmiloff-Smith’s legacy 
This, then, is Karmiloff-Smith’s legacy: development ought to be taken 
seriously. To some researchers (e.g., in the field of developmental systems), this is 
a truism. But to others, this is not so obvious. For some researchers, the 
environment merely triggers a prespecified programme, and development is the 
unfolding of that programme. But to Karmiloff-Smith, development itself is key to 
understanding the human mind.  
As she put it: “I had thought that psychology was just about psychoanalysis or 
reaction time and questionnaires, but … [it embraces] logic, physics, biology, 
mathematics, evolution, genetics, anthropology and, above all, development, in the 
deepest sense of the term.” (Karmiloff-Smith, 2008, p. 280). 
Her work and guidance will live on in generations of researchers. 
 
	 18	
References 
Bak, T. H., Nissan, J. J., Allerhand, M. M., & Deary, I. J. (2014). Does 
bilingualism influence cognitive aging?. Annals of Neurology, 75(6), 959-
963. 
 
Bates, E., & Roe, K. (2001). Language development in children with unilateral 
brain injury. In C. A. Nelson & M. Luciana (Eds.), Handbook of 
Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience (p. 281-307). Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
  
Bellugi, U., Marks, S., Bihrle, A. M., & Sabo, H. (1988). Dissociation between 
language and cognitive functions in Williams syndrome. In D. Bishop & K. 
Mogford (Eds.), Language development in exceptional circumstances (pp. 
177-189). London: Churchill Livingstone. 
 
Bellugi, U., Wang, P., & Jernigan, T. L. (1994). Williams syndrome: An unusual 
neuropsychological profile. In S. Broman & J. Graffman (Eds.), Atypical 
cognitive deficits in developmental disorders: Implications for brain 
function (pp. 23–56). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.  
 
Bialystok, E. (2009). Bilingualism: The good, the bad, and the 
indifferent. Bilingualism: Language and Cognition, 12(01), 3-11. 
 
Brock, J. (2007). Language abilities in Williams syndrome: A critical review. 
Development and Psychopathology, 19, 97-127. 
 
Carey, S. (2009). The Origin of Concepts. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Chomsky N. (1959). Review of Skinner's Verbal Behavior. Language, 35, 26–58. 
 
Chomsky, N. (1975). Reflections on language. New York: Pantheon Books.  
 
Chomsky, N. (1991). Linguistics and cognitive science: Problems and mysteries. 
In A. Kasher (Ed.), The Chomskyan turn (pp. 26-53). Cambridge, MA: 
Blackwell. 
 
D'Souza, H., Cowie, D., Karmiloff-Smith, A., & Bremner, A. J. (2017). 
Specialization of the motor system in infancy: from broad tuning to 
selectively specialized purposeful actions. Developmental Science, 20(4), 
e12409. doi:10.1111/desc.12409 
 
D’Souza, D., D’Souza, H., & Karmiloff-Smith, A. (2017). Precursors to language 
development in typically and atypically infants and toddlers: the 
importance of embracing complexity. Journal of Child Language, 44(3), 1-
37. 
 
D'Souza, D., & Karmiloff-Smith, A. (2011). When modularization fails to occur: 
A developmental perspective. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 28(3-4), 276-
287. 
	 19	
 
D’Souza, D., & Karmiloff-Smith, A. (2016). Why a developmental perspective is 
critical for understanding human cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 
39, e122. doi:10.1017/S0140525X15001569. 
 
Filippi, R., & Karmiloff-Smith, A. (2013). What can neurodevelopmental 
disorders teach us about typical development? In C. R. Marshall (Eds.), 
Current issues in developmental disorders (pp. 193-209). East Sussex, UK: 
Psychology Press. 
 
Filippi, R., D’Souza, D., Bright, P. (2017). A developmental approach to bilingual 
research: the effects of multi-language experience from early infancy to 
old age. Manuscript in preparation. 
 
Filippi, R., Morris, J., Richardson, F. M., Bright, P., Thomas, M. S., Karmiloff-
Smith, A., & Marian, V. (2015). Bilingual children show an advantage in 
controlling verbal interference during spoken language 
comprehension. Bilingualism: Language and Cognition, 18(03), 490-501. 
 
Fodor, J. (1980). Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in 
cognitive psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 63-109. 
 
Fonteneau, C., & van der Lely, H. J. K. (2008). Electrical brain responses in 
language-impaired children reveal grammar-specific deficits. PLoS ONE, 
3, e1832, 1–6. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001832. 
 
Frost, D. O., & Metin, C. (1985). Induction of functional retinal projections to the 
somatosensory system. Nature, 317, 162-164. 
 
Gottlieb, G. (1991). Experiential canalization of behavioral development: Theory. 
Developmental Psychology, 27(1), 4-13. 
 
Grosjean, F. (2010). Bilingual: Life and Reality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.  
 
Guarini, A., Sansavini, A., Fabbri, C., Alessandroni, R., Faldella, G., & Karmiloff-
Smith, A. (2009). Reconsidering the impact of preterm birth on language 
outcome. Early Human Development, 85(10), 639-645. 
 
Guarini, A., Sansavini, A., Fabbri, C., Savini, S., Alessandroni, R., Faldella, G., & 
Karmiloff-Smith, A. (2010). Long-term effects of preterm birth on 
language and literacy at eight years. Journal of Child Language, 37(4), 
865-885. 
 
Hernandez, A. E., & Li, P. (2007) Age of acquisition: Its neural and computational 
mechanisms. Psychological Bulletin, 133(4), 638-650. 
 
Johnson, M. H. (2001). Functional brain development in humans. Nature Reviews 
Neuroscience, 2, 475–483. 
 
	 20	
Johnson, M. H. (2011). Interactive specialization: a domain-general framework for 
human functional brain development?. Developmental Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 1(1), 7-21. 
 
Johnson, M. H. (in press). Autism as an adaptive common variant pathway for 
human brain development. Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience. 
[Corrected proof available online 9 February 2017] 
 
Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1986). From meta-processes to conscious access: Evidence 
from children's metalinguistic and repair data. Cognition, 23(2), 95-147. 
 
Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1990). Piaget and Chomsky on language acquisition: divorce 
or marriage?. First Language, 10(30), 255-260. 
 
Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1992). Beyond modularity: A developmental perspective on 
cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT press. 
 
Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1998). Development itself is the key to understanding 
developmental disorders. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2, 389–398. 
 
Karmiloff-Smith, A. (2008). One on one… with Annette Karmiloff-Smith, 
Professorial Research Fellow at Birkbeck College, University of 
London. The Psychologist, 21(3), 280. [An interview with Annette 
Karmiloff-Smith.] 
 
Karmiloff-Smith, A. (2009). Nativism versus neuroconstructivism: rethinking the 
study of developmental disorders. Developmental Psychology, 45(1), 56. 
 
Karmiloff-Smith, A., D’Souza, D., Dekker, T. M., Van Herwegen, J., Xu, F., 
Rodic, M., & Ansari, D. (2012). Genetic and environmental vulnerabilities 
in children with neurodevelopmental disorders. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 109(Supplement 2), 17261-17265. 
 
Karmiloff-Smith, A., Grant, J., Berthoud, I., Davies, M., Howlin, P., & Udwin, O. 
(1997). Language and Williams syndrome: How intact is ''intact''? Child 
Development, 68(2), 246-262. 
 
Krishnan, S., Watkins, K. E., & Bishop, D. (2016). Neurobiological basis of 
language learning difficulties. Trends in Cognitive Science, 20(9), 701-714. 
 
Kuhl, P. K., Stevens, E., Hayashi, A., Deguchi, T., Kiritani, S., & Iverson, P. 
(2006). Infants show a facilitation effect for native language phonetic 
perception between 6 and 12 months. Developmental Science, 9(2), F13-
F21. 
 
Landau, B., & Zukowski, A. (2003). Objects, motions, and paths: Spatial language 
in children with Williams syndrome. Developmental Neuropsychology, 
23(1-2), 105-137. 
 
	 21	
Lukacs, A., Pleh, C., & Racsmany, M. (2004). Language in Hungarian children 
with Williams syndrome. In S. Bartke & J. Siegmuller (Eds.), Williams 
syndrome across languages (pp. 187-220). Amsterdam, Netherlands: John 
Benjamins Publishing Company. 
 
Mareschal, D., Johnson, M. H., Sirois, S., Spratling, M. W., Thomas, M. S. C., & 
Westermann, G. (2007). Neuroconstructivism: How the brain constructs 
cognition (Vol. 1). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
Oyama, S. (1985). The ontogeny of information: Developmental systems and 
evolution. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 
 
Pascalis, O., Scott, L. S., Kelly, D. J., Shannon, R. W., Nicholson, E., Coleman, 
M., & Nelson, C. A. (2005). Plasticity of face processing in infancy. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America, 102(14), 5297-5300. 
 
Perovic, A., & Wexler, K. (2007). Complex grammar in Williams syndrome. 
Clinical Linguistics and Phonetics, 21, 729-745. 
 
Perovic, A., & Wexler, K. (2010). Development of verbal passive in Williams 
syndrome. Journal of Speech, Language and Hearing Research, 53(5), 
1294-1306. 
 
Phillips, C. E., Jarrold, C., Baddeley, A. D., Grant, J., & Karmiloff-Smith, A. 
(2004). Comprehension of spatial language terms in Williams syndrome: 
Evidence for an interaction between domains of strength and 
weakness. Cortex, 40(1), 85-101. 
 
Piaget, J. (1970). Genetic Epistemology. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
Inc.  
 
Piatelli-Palmarini, M. (2001). Speaking of learning: How do we acquire our 
marvellous facility for expressing ourselves in words? Nature, 411, 887–
888. 
 
Pinker, S. (1999). Words and rules: The ingredients of language. New York: Basic 
Books. 
 
Schlaggar, B. L., & O'Leary, D. D. M. (1991). Potential of visual cortex to 
develop an array of functional units unique to somatosensory cortex. 
Science, 252, 1556-1560. 
 
Spelke, S. (2000). Core knowledge. American Psychologist, 55, 1233–1243. 
 
Stiles, J., Bates, E., Thal, D., Trauner, D., & Reilly, J. (2002). Linguistic and 
spatial cognitive development in children with pre- and perinatal focal 
brain injury: A ten-year overview from the San Diego Longitudinal Project. 
In M. H. Johnson, Y. Munakata, & R. Gilmore (Eds.), Brain development 
and cognition: A reader (pp. 643–664). Oxford, UK: Blackwell. 
	 22	
 
Sur, M., Garraghty, P. E., & Roe, A. V. (1988). Experimentally induced visual 
projections into auditory thalamus and cortex. Science, 242, 1437-1441. 
 
Sur, M., Pallas, S. L., & Roe, A. W. (1990). Cross-modal plasticity in cortical 
development: Differentiation and specification of sensory neocortex. 
Trends in Neuroscience, 13(6), 227-233. 
 
Werker, J. F., & Tees, R. C. (1984). Cross-language speech perception: Evidence 
for perceptual reorganization during the first year of life. Infant Behavior 
and Development, 7(1), 49-63. 
